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Abstract
In the field of mergers and acquisitions, German and international tax law allow for several
opportunities to step up a firm’s assets, i.e., to revaluate the assets at fair market values. When a step-up
is performed the taxpayer recognizes a taxable gain, but also obtains tax benefits in the form of higher
future depreciation allowances associated with stepping up the tax base of the assets. This tax-planning
problem is well known in taxation literature and can also be applied to firm valuation in the presence
of taxation. However, the known models usually assume a perfect loss offset. If this assumption is
abandoned, the depreciation allowances may lose value as they become tax effective at a later point
in time, or even never if there are not enough cash flows to be offset against. This aspect is especially
relevant if future cash flows are assumed to be uncertain. This paper shows that a step-up may be
disadvantageous or a firm overvalued if these aspects are not integrated into the basic calculus. Com-
pared to the standard approach, assets should be stepped up only in a few cases and — under specific
conditions — at a later point in time. Firm values may be considerably lower under imperfect loss offset.
JEL classifiation: H25;41
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1 Introduction
The fair market values of assets can exceed their
book values substantially. German and interna-
tional tax law offer several opportunities to dis-
close these so-called hidden reserves. All these
opportunities have in common that book values
are stepped up to their fair market values. As a
result, hidden reserves are taxed and can be writ-
ten off in the future due to a higher book value
of the assets. Generally a step-up is advantageous
if the positive tax rate effect of disclosing hidden
reserves at a reduced tax rate outweighs the neg-
ative timing effect of depreciating the stepped-up
tax base in future years.
There are two different step-up occasions: those in
connection with a transaction in which a price for
the assets is paid, and those without a transaction.
In the latter case, the legislator has to determine a
fair market value (step-up value).
The choice between asset deal and share deal —
one that is available in almost every tax regime
— can be seen as an example of the first kind. If
shares in a target firm are bought, the tax base
of the underlying assets is generally not stepped
up. If, on the contrary, the assets of a limited
liability corporation are purchased, the target’s
assets may be stepped up to fair market value. If
the transferee pays a consideration in excess of
the fair market value, that excess is regarded as
goodwill. Under Section 338 of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), even if the target’s stock
is purchased, the transaction can be treated as a
hypothetical asset deal for tax purposes. At the firm
level, then, there is a choice between book value
and fair value in the case of a transaction. Erickson
and Wang (2007) showed under which conditions
such a step-up is advantageous under US tax law
in the context of S and C corporations and proved
their results empirically. In addition, Erickson and
Wang (2000) found that the step-up benefits are
positively correlated with acquisition premiums.
Let us take German tax law as an example of the
second kind. According to the Reorganization Tax
Act (Umwandlungssteuergesetz)mergers and con-
versions of business enterprises can be performed
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at book value or at fair market value or every
value in between (§§ 3, 11, 20 para. 2 UmwStG).
Accordingly, without any market transaction, i.e.
without a price being paid for the hidden reserves,
the taxpayer may disclose these at firm level at
any amount up to their fair market value. This
regulation has been examined from a tax-planning
point of view by, e.g., Brähler, Göttsche, andRauch
(2009) and Müller and Semmler (2003a).
With reference to US tax law Erickson (1998) and
Schipper and Smith (1991) come to the conclusion
that the immediate tax cost of disclosing hidden
reserves often exceeds future tax benefits. Schipper
and Smith (1991: 327), pointed out that this is
potentially because "the firm may not generate
sufficient income in the post-buyout period to take
full advantage of the increased deductions." This
argument will play an important role in this paper.
There are several similarities to the so-called tax
exhaustion (the point at which an additional euro
tax deduction does not reduce tax payments fur-
ther) theory, which states that firms with a high
probability of facing a tax exhaustion status are less
likely to finance with debt (Macie-Mason 1990#.
The depreciation of the acquisition price/step-up
value can also lead to tax exhaustion status in fu-
ture periods, which would cause a reduction in the
value of the depreciation tax shield and, therefore,
in the acquisition premium.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) showed that as a
firm’s depreciation allowances increase its demand
for interest deductions declines (substitution ef-
fect). In the following, the opposite effect is de-
scribedanalytically.Dependingon the tax-effective
future cash flows, which of course are diminished
by future interest deductions, the maximum and
optimal step-up value and thus the resulting de-
preciation deductions decrease with rising interest
deductions.
While empirical studies indicated that tax payers
do take into account whether certain deductions
are tax effective or not, most analytical models
in the fields of M&A assume an immediate loss
offset (Müller and Semmler 2003a; Müller and
Semmler 2003b; Müller, Langkau, and Schmidt
2011; Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and
Shevlin 2009: 405 et seq.). This gap shall be closed
in the following.
In this paper an analytical model is set up and the
optimal and maximum step-up values and their
optimal timing are derived, with special consider-
ation given to imperfect loss offset anduncertainty.
These features distinguish this examination from
previous tax-planning studies. As indicated above,
the country-specific step-up rules differ in detail,
but coincide in their basic principles (PwC 2006).
For this reason, the followingmodel abstracts from
a given tax regime and instead focuses on the basic
tax effects in order to achieve general results.
I show that restricting depreciation allowances
to the cash flows influences the step-up calculus
considerably. There is not only an optimum but
also a maximum step-up value, which should not
be exceeded. Taking an uncertain lifetime of the
investment into account, both valuesmay decrease
further. Also, in the field of acquisitions the buyer’s
price diminishes. The standard calculuswould lead
to wrong decisions.
The aim of the paper is twofold: On the one hand,
it of course addresses tax-planners: they need to
know whether to choose the step-up alternative or
not, or how to calculate the acquisition premium.
The standard model only tells them to compare
the step-up tax with the tax savings from the de-
preciation allowances, which are assumed to be
certain. This does not allow them to take uncer-
tainty or imperfect loss offset into consideration.
Apart from the tax- planning function, my model
also permits tax policy conclusions. The question
in this case could be: If tax authoritieswant taxpay-
ers to disclose their hidden reserves, to what extent
does the step-up tax rate have to be lowered? The
cause-and-effect link of the tax planners’ view is
transformed into a goal-and-means link of the tax
authorities’ view.
On the other hand, the main propositions of the
paper can be tested empirically. For example, an
examination can be made to determine whether
there is a "reverse" substitution effect between
interest deductions and step-up value, or if asset
deal acquisition premiums can be better explained
by the suggested approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the calculus of a tax-optimal
step-up under certainty. In section 3 uncertainty
concerning the lifetime of the investment is intro-
duced and in section 4 the optimal point in time
of the step-up is determined. Section 5 concludes
with a summary.
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2 Step-up under certainty
The following model calculates the net present
value of the step-up (NPV). The step-up decision
can be regarded as an investment decision. The tax
payment on the step-up,which canbe calculatedby
multiplying the disclosed hidden reserves A by the
reduced tax rate sr, is the outflow of the investment
in t = 0, while the tax savings (tax rate s) that result
from the depreciation (dep(t),
  UL
0
dep(t)dt = 1) of
the disclosed hidden reserves over their useful
lives (UL) are the future cash flows. Initially, all
variables are considered to be deterministic so
there is no uncertainty concerning future cash
receipts.
2.1 Perfect loss offset
Assuming a perfect loss offset means that depre-
ciation allowances are always tax-effective, even if
there are not enough profits against which they
can be offset. The net present value of the step-
up investment in continuous time, which is to be
maximized, can then be described as follows (is:
after-tax interest rate; for simplicity it is assumed
that all book values before the step-up are zero):
(1) max
A
NPV (A) =
-sr · A + s
  UL
0
A · dep(t) · e−is·tdt
Of course, the NPV can only be positive and there-
fore a planning problem only exists if hidden re-
serves are taxed at a reduced tax rate (sr). This is
a realistic assumption that is illustrated in brief by
the following examples:
  National tax regimes often allow for a reduced
tax rate if hidden reserves, which have been
built up over years, are disclosed, especially to
avoid the negative effects of a progressive tax
schedule. For instance, German tax law applies
a reduced tax rate if business enterprises are
sold or if they are converted into a corporation
at fair market values.
  Under certain circumstances existing
loss carry-forwards may vanish (e.g., if
corporations are merged or sold). These
loss carry-forwards can be transformed into
depreciable assets by disclosing hidden
reserves; despite existing loss carry-forwards,
in many countries a part of the step-up value
may be taxed due to minimum tax regulations,
which leads also to a reduced tax rate.
  There are many situations in which today’s tax
rate on hidden reserves differs from the tax
rate in future years because of tax reforms,
progressive tax rates etc.
If disclosing hidden reserves also has effects on
financial as well as tax accounting, it is possible
that non-tax aspects will influence the step-up de-
cision, especially as far as dividend payments are
concerned. In the case of a merger or conversion,
according to German tax law (or any other tax
law with a two-book system) there is no link be-
tween financial income and taxable income, and
the problem is a mere tax minimization problem.
In the case of an asset or share deal transaction
non-tax aspects may play a role. For complexity
reasons I leave them aside and treat the problem
as a mere tax minimization problem.
The step-up calculus can then be explained as
follows.
If the tax rate effect exceeds the time effect of
taxation, the assets should be stepped up.
(2) sr ≤ s
  UL
0
dep(t) · e−is·tdt
If the taxpayer is able to influence the step-up value
A, the latter should be as high as possible in order
to maximize the NPV.
The same calculus is valid for firm acquisitions. In
the case of an asset deal the first part of equation
(1) describes the situation of the seller, who has to
pay taxes on the disclosed hidden reserves (sr · A).
The second part quantifies the depreciation tax
savings of the acquirer. The only difference is that
in this scenario A represents the acquisition price
P, which cannot be set by the tax payer but rather
results from amaximum/minimum price calculus,
which is explained in the following.
Without selling the firm the investor realizes the
after-tax discounted cash flow value PVCF ; if he
sells the firm, he has to pay (reduced) taxes on the
proceeds of the sale (P). In order to be indiffer-
ent to the situation without selling the firm, the
seller has to demand aminimumprice, which after
taxation still equals his pre-acquisition discounted
cash flow value, i.e.
(3) P·(1 − sr) ≥ PVCF   P ≥ PVCF1−sr
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Corresponding to the taxation of the seller’s
proceeds the buyer is allowed to depreciate the
price (acquisition costs) P; these depreciation
allowances lower future tax payments. Therefore,
the buyer is willing to pay a price up to these tax
savings, over and above the present value of the
cash flows:
(4) P ≤
PVCF + s
  UL
0
P · dep(t) · e−t·isdt  
P ≤ PVCF
1−s·
  UL
0
dep(t)·e−t·is dt
Assuming identical cash receipts for seller and
buyer, an acquisition with disclosed hidden re-
serves will only take place if
(5) sr ≤ s ·
  UL
0
dep(t) · e−t·isdt
which is identical to equation (2). These
approaches in discrete time are well known in
business taxation literature (Scholes, Wolfson,
Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin 2009:405 et seq.;
Schreiber 2008: 742 et seq.).
2.2 Imperfect loss offset
Under the regimeof an imperfect loss offset, depre-
ciation allowances are not recognized as expenses
and therefore are not tax-effective as far as they
exceed the investment’s cash flows; instead a tax
loss carry-forward is induced which reduces taxes
in future periods, but only if there are sufficient
taxable cash flows. The after-tax interest rate is
not influenced by an existing loss carry-forward,
as I assume that the cash flows are not reinvested
at company level and thus interest income cannot
be offset against the loss carry-forward. I therefore
assume is to be independent of the actual profit or
loss situation. There are no tax-effective cash flows
from other investment projects against which the
remaining depreciation allowances can be offset.
This assumption seems especially relevant in the
present scenario (merger and acquisition) because
it is not a single investment project that is val-
ued but rather a bundle of projects, and the tax-
effective cash flow is already the net cash flow of
all the firm’s investment projects.
2.2.1 Simplified Approach
In the following the depreciation allowances of for-
mula (1) are replaced by the underlying cash flows
by which the former are limited, i.e. I assume that
the cash flows restrict the depreciation allowances
at every point in time t, which allows us to focus on
the cash flows. Later on I depart from this simpli-
fying assumption and analyze the consequences. I
will restrict the analysis to geometrically increasing
or decreasing cash flows.
Given the starting cash flow CF and the growth
rate ω it has to be determined at which point in
time x the step-up amount A is amortized by the
cash flows:
(6)
  x
0
CF · et·ωdt = A  x = Log[
A·ω
CF +1]
ω
Now the NPV of the step-up investment can be cal-
culated by substituting the depreciation function
for the cash flow function:
(7) NPV (A) =
-A·sr + s
  Log[A·ωCF +1]
ω
0
CFet·(ω−is)dt
=-A·sr + s
CF·

(1+AωCF )1−
is
ω −1

ω−is
First it is assumed that the taxpayer can determine
the step-up value of the asset. This could be the
case if there was no underlying market transac-
tion in connection with the step-up. The step-up
value is therefore determined bymeans of financial
theory or comparable market transactions, which
always offer a range of possible values depending
on the parameters that are used. In the case of a
conversion or a merger German tax law explicitly
allows for any value between book value and fair
market value. Finally, even in the case of an un-
derlying market transaction it may be possible to
influence the amount of disclosed hidden reserves;
for example, an acquisition could be managed as a
part asset, part share deal.
In order to determine the optimal step-up value,
equation (7) has to be differentiated with respect
to A, which leads to the following first-order con-
dition
(8) s
 
1 + A
*ω
CF
− isω − sr = 0
and because of concavity, to the optimal step-up
value A*
(9) A* =
CF·

−1+( srs )
− ωis

ω
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For the special case of time-discrete, constant
cash flows (ω = 0), Brähler, Göttsche, and Rauch
(2009) found a similar result. Concentrating on
the tax rate relation srs , comparative statics shows
that A* increases if the relation srs decreases, as the
costs of disclosing hidden reserves at tax rate sr
decline compared to the earnings of the future de-
preciation allowances, which become tax-effective
at tax rate s. It can also be seen that if there is no
reduced tax rate (sr = s), hidden reserves should
not be disclosed at all as A* becomes zero. On the
other hand, as long as there is no taxation on the
step-up (sr = 0), there is no maximum value of
disclosure as A* goes to infinity.
In most cases the step-up value cannot be deter-
mined by the taxpayer, but is prescribed by the
legislator or results from an underlying transac-
tion. In this case the question arises as to whether
the NPV of a given step-up value is greater or less
than zero, i.e., the root of function (7) is sought.
Although there is no general analytical solution,
closed-formsolutions for special cases arepossible.
In the following, three special cases are analyzed.
Assuming an infinite cash flow series, ω must
not exceed is to achieve reasonable results using
the valuation formula CF(1−s)is−ω . Formula (7) is not
defined for this extreme value (is = ω); however,
l’Hôpital’s rule can be applied and thus formula (7)
simplifies to
(10)  ω is NPV (A) =
sCF·Log(1+
A·is
CF )
is
− A · sr
As a second special case I assume ω = 0, i.e.
constant cash receipts over time; here, too, formula
(7) is not defined and l’Hôpital’s rule must be
applied:
(11)  ω 0 NPV (A) =
sCF·(1−e
−A·isCF )
is
− A · sr
Finally, negative growth rates are analyzed; in the
case ofω = −is formula (7) turns into the quadratic
equation
(12) NPV (A)=-A ·s
  A·is
2·CF − 1

− A · sr
By setting equations (10), (11) and (12) equal to
zero and solving for A (setting v = srs ) the max-
imum step-up values are determined (neglecting
the possible solution A = 0), which are shown in
Table 1. For details concerning the Lambert W
function see Appendix A1 and for the derivation of
(16) see Appendix A2.
By analogy the maximum prices of the buyer can
be determined by replacing the second part of
formula (4) by the first part of equation (11) and
(12) setting PVCF = CF(1−s)is (discounted after-tax
cash flows); these are also shown in Table 1 (there
are no reasonable valuation results for ω = is).
From these maximum prices P the necessary re-
duced tax rate of the seller can be derived by
inserting formulae (15) and (17) into formula (3)
and solving for sr:
(18) sr,ω=0 ≤ 1 + −1+s
1+W[− se]
(19) sr,ω=−is ≤
1
2

1 −
 
1 − s + s

It can be shown that by inserting these reduced
tax rates into the corresponding formulae (14) and
(16) one receives the maximum price of the buyer
according to formulae (15) and (17). That means
that themaximum step-up value and the firm price
coincide provided there is price congruence, i.e. the
minimum price of the seller equals the maximum
price of the buyer. In the following Iwill restrict the
analysis to the maximum step-up value and thus
combine the buyer’s and the seller’s view.Of course
the analysis could also be performed concentrating
on the maximum price of the buyer.
Figure 1 illustrates the step-up calculus (NPV (A))
and the analogous application to firm valuations
(P(A)).
The function NPV (A) describes the net advantage,
which is generated by a step-up without a market
transaction according to formula (7). It starts at
zero, has a maximum value and returns to zero.
The slope of the function changes as the present
value of tax-effective cash flows, against which the
depreciation allowances can be offset, decreases.
The remaining functions describe the acquisition
case.Here, because of theunderlyingmarket trans-
action, the step-up value (A) is linked to the acqui-
sition price (P), which is expressed by the function
P(A) = A. All possible combinations of A and P lie
on this function. Starting from the firm value with-
out any depreciation deductions (PVCF) the buyer
is willing to pay a higher price with an increas-
ing depreciable step-up value (A) and the seller
demands a higher price as he has to pay taxes
12
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Table 1: Maximum step-up value and price
AMax PMax
(13) AMaxω=is =
CF·(−1− 1vW(−e−v·v))
is
-
(14) AMaxω=0 =
CF· W −e−
1
v · 1v +
1
v
is
(15) PMaxω=0 ≤
CF(1+W(− se))
is
(16) AMaxω=−is =
2·CF(1−v)
is
for v ≥ 1
2
CF
2is·v
for v < 1
2
(17) PMaxω=−is ≤
CF(−1+ 1−s+s)
s·is
Figure 1: NPV , P depending on A
on the disclosed hidden reserves. In the standard
approach these functions show a linear course.
Due to the reasons mentioned above, in the case
of an imperfect loss offset the buyer’s function is
concave.
At the intersection of these functions with the
function P(A) = A is the maximum price the buyer
is willing to pay depending on the scenario. Of
course, the maximum price in the case of a perfect
loss offset (PMax,pLO) lies above that in the case of
an imperfect loss offset (PMax,iLO). The difference
diminishes the negotiable acquisition premium.
The minimum price of the seller is of course not
influenced by the loss offset scenario.
Figure 1 shows that the calculus in the acquisition
caseand in the step-upcaseareessentially the same
13
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(graphically they are rotated and shifted, though);
the only difference is that in the acquisition case
the NPV of the step-up investment is distributed
between buyer and seller. In both cases a step-up
is advantageous only for A < AMax; otherwise a
transaction should rather be carried out as a share
deal and a conversion performed at book values. As
mentioned above, I will concentrate on the more
general step-up calculus.
2.2.2 Detailed Approach
In this section I abandon the simplifying assump-
tion that depreciation allowances exceed or at least
equal the cash flows at every point in time and an-
alyze under which conditions the results still hold.
In this case the given depreciation allowances have
to be taken into account. It is necessary to dis-
tinguish between increasing and decreasing cash
flows.
Increasing cash flows If the depreciation al-
lowances exceed the cash flows, they are only tax-
effective in the amount of the cash receipts. The
remainder leads to a loss carry-forward, which be-
comes tax-effective as soon as cash flows exceed
depreciation allowances. Figure 2 illustrates the
calculus for both a low step-up value A and a high
step-up value A
The straight line depreciation allowances can be
calculated by dividing the step-up value by the
useful life of the asset (dep(t) := AUL ). It can be seen
that in the case of a low step-up value (A ) the cash
receipts are not restricting and the depreciation
allowances are fully tax effective; however, a high
Figure 2: Cash flow and depreciation
function
t
A´´
UL
A´
UL
  I  
  II  
CF(t)
t
dept
CFt
step-up value (A ) causes a loss carry-forward in
the amount of area I, which can only be offset
against future cash receipts in addition to the ex-
isting depreciation allowances (area II). The arrow
indicates that the higher the step-up value A, the
more restrictive the cash flows until they are solely
restrictive.
Equation (20) calculates at what point in time t*
the accrued loss carry-forward (area I) is recovered
completely by future earnings (area II):
(20) t
*
0
CFeωt − AUL dt =
CF·(−1+et
*ω)
ω −
A·t*
UL = 0
Solving equation (20) for t* using the Lambert W
function yields:
(21) t* =
−CF·UL−A·W −CF·e
− CF·ULA UL
A
A·ω
The function W (z) is multivalued for −1e ≤ z < 0,
i.e., there are two possible real values ofW (z). One
of them always leads to the trivial solution t* = 0.
Therefore, the solutionof the secondbranch,which
is often referred to as W−1(z) (Chapeau-Blondeau
and Monir 2002), is relevant.
Knowing t* the NPV of the step-up investment
depending on A can be calculated as follows. As
long as the cash receipts do not limit the de-
preciation allowances, the basic calculus assum-
ing full loss offset is valid. Here, depreciation al-
lowances have to be lower than CF . Therefore,
A
UL ≤ CF A ≤ CF · UL must hold. For very high
values of A only the cash flows are restricting and
the calculus of the simplified approach according
to (7) can be applied. This is the case if t* lies
above UL, which determines the second thresh-
old. Solving (21) for A setting t* ≥ UL one obtains
A ≥ CF(−1+e
UL·ω)
ω . For values of A between these
thresholds the cash flows limit the depreciation al-
lowances until point in time t*; from that point in
time onwards the present value of the depreciation
allowances has to be calculated.
14
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
	

	


 ! "# $
(22) NPV(A)=
s UL
0
A
UL · e
−t·is dt − A · sr
for A < CF · UL
s t
*(A)
0
CFet(ω−is)dt + ULt*(A)
A
ULe
−t·is dt − Asr
for CF · UL ≤ A < CF(−1+e
UL·ω)
ω
s·CF −1+(1+ AωCF )1−
is
ω
ω−is − A · sr
for A ≥ CF(−1+e
UL·ω)
ω
Figure 3 illustrates formula (22) for CF := .04, s :=
.5, sr := 0.25, is := .06,ω := .05.
It shows that the NPV that focuses only on the
cash flows limits the NPV that is calculated using
straight-line depreciation with an assumed useful
life of 15 and 20 years, respectively (NPV_15/20).
The shorter the useful life, i.e., the higher the
depreciation allowances, the sooner the functions
converge with the NPV function because the de-
preciation allowances in the first periods increase
such that the loss carry-forward is not recovered
until the end of the depreciation period. The tax-
effective depreciation allowances hence decrease
or increase to the level of the cash flows over the
whole depreciation period. In addition, the max-
ima of the functions differ. The maxima of (22)
cannot be analytically determined according to
(9). Of course there is a numerical solution for the
individual case.However, as the functions coincide
for moderate depreciation periods before the zero
point is reached, all conclusions concerning the
maximum step-up value are still valid.
Figure 3: NPV(A) for CF := .04, s := .5,
sr := 0.25, is := .06, ω := .05
NPV_20
NPV_15
NPV
0.5 1.0 1.5
A
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
NPVA
Decreasing cash flows Figure 4 illustrates
how the calculus changes if decreasing cash flows
are taken into account. Again, for a low step-up
value (A ) the basic calculus is valid as the cash
flows never fall below the depreciation allowances.
For medium step-up values (A ), however, in con-
trast to Figure 2, tax-effective earnings in early
periods cannot be used completely; a loss carry-
forward accrues as soon as the cash flow function
falls below the depreciation function (t > t◦) and is
used after the depreciation period has ended.
The intersection of the cash flow function and de-
preciation function can be determined by solving
the equation CF(t) = dep(t) CFeωt − AUL = 0,
which results in t◦ = Log[
A
CF·UL ]
ω . From this point on-
wards a loss carry-forward accrues. In contrast to
Figure 2 this loss carry-forward cannot be used un-
til the depreciation period has ended. By equating
area I (loss carry-forward) with area II (use of loss
carry-forward) the point in time t** until which the
cash receipts are tax-exempt can be calculated:
(23) ULLog[ ACF·UL]
ω
A
UL − CFe
ω·t dt =
t**
UL CF · e
ω·t dt
t** =
Log
A(1+UL·ω−Log[ ACF·UL])
CF·UL
ω
Thus the net present value of the step-up invest-
ment reads:
Figure 4: Cash flow and depreciation
function
t°
 I  
 II  
A´´
UL
A´
UL
tUL
t
dept
CFt
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(24) NPV (A)=
 

s
 UL
0
A
UL · e
−t·is dt − A · sr
for A < CF · eUL·ω · UL
s ·
 t◦
0
A
ULe
−t·is dt +
 t**
t◦ CFe
t◦(ω−is)dt

− Asr
for CF · eUL·ω · UL ≤ A < CF · UL
CF·s
 
−1+(1+ AωCF )1−
is
ω

ω−is − A · sr
for A ≥ CF · UL
The thresholds can be determined in analogy to the
previous section: If the depreciation allowances lie
below the cash flow function until the useful life of
theasset is reached, there isno restrictive effect and
the basic calculus can be applied. Therefore AUL <
CF ·eUL·ω   A < CF ·eUL·ω ·ULmust hold. Only the
cash flows are restricting if AUL > CF . Therefore, the
second threshold readsA > CF ·UL. The thresholds
differ from the last paragraph, though the course of
the NPV functions and therefore the interpretation
is very similar to Figure 3.
2.2.3 Simplified vs. detailed approach
It can be seen that the NPV functions of the de-
tailed approach for both increasing and decreasing
cash receipts coincide for high step-up values with
those of the simplified approach; at what level of A
both functions coincide depends especially on the
given depreciation period. The shorter the depre-
ciation period, the higher the slope of the first part
of the functions in the detailed approach and the
earlier the coincidence with the simplified func-
tion. If both functions meet before point zero is
reached, only the simplified approach is necessary
to determine the maximum step-up value A.
Finally I analyze under which conditions it is pos-
sible to exclusively use the simplified approach.
From (22) it can be seen that—in the case of in-
creasing cash receipts—the functions coincide for
A ≥ CF(−1+e
UL·ω)
ω . For ω = is the maximum step-up
value is determined by (13). Equating both and
solving for the useful life yields:
(25) UL* = Log(−W(−e
−v·v)· 1v )
is
UL* denotes the useful life which may not be ex-
ceeded in order to obtain the same maximum
step-up value in the detailed approach as in the
simplified approach. The values in the scenario
ω = 0 can be determined by analogy. In this case
CF(−1+eULω)
ω changes to UL · CF:
(26) UL* =
s+W
 
−e−
1
v · 1v

sr
is·sr
This turns out to be the same useful life that is
necessary to satisfy condition (2) for a straight line
depreciation; as both cash receipts and deprecia-
tion allowances have a slope of zero the first and
second threshold of formula (22), respectively (24)
coincide.
Finally, for the negative growth rate ω = −is for-
mula (16) has to equal the last threshold of formula
(24); this leads to
(27) UL* =
 
2(1−v)
is
for v ≥ 1
2
1
2is·v
for v < 1
2
Figure 5 shows the necessary useful lives depend-
ing on the reduced tax rate for is := .04 and
s := .5. The ω = 0-function depicts—as mentioned
above—the maximum useful life that is necessary
for the step-up tobe advantageous in the first place.
In Figure 3 this useful life would lead to a slope
of zero. In all other scenarios the depreciation al-
lowances have to be higher, i.e. useful life has to
be shorter. But as Figure 5 shows, even in the case
of decreasing cash flows the resulting maximum
useful lives are quite realistic.
Conclusion In the standard approach with the
assumption of a perfect loss offset it is only nec-
essary that equation (1) is satisfied; I show that
Figure 5: UL depending on the the reduced
tax rate sr for is := .04 and s := .5
Ω=0
Ω  is
Ω  is
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
sr
20
40
60
80
100
120
UL
16
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
	

	


 ! "# $
in the case of an imperfect loss offset as an addi-
tional condition, the step-up value may not exceed
a certain maximum value which depends on the
underlying cash flows.
Further, I prove that the acquisition premium in
the case of an asset deal may be considerably
smaller when assuming an imperfect loss offset.
I presented a simplified and a detailed approach
to calculate the maximum step-up value and show
that for reasonable useful lives, the simplified ap-
proach is sufficient for determining the maximum
values.
3 Step-up under uncertainty
concerning the lifetime of the
investment
In the previous section I assumed that the underly-
ing investment project lives forever. In the follow-
ing I introduce uncertainty concerning the lifetime
of the investment project (T). At any time T , if the
project has lasted that long, there is the probability
λdT that it will die during the next short interval of
time dT . So the probability density function of T is
(28) f(T)=λe−λT
This approach, which is also applied by, e.g., Gry-
glewicz, Huisman, and Kort (2008), McDonald
and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 200
et seq.), is not an economic lifetime approach that
would require comparing the alternatives "selling
the project at market value" and "continuing the
project" at every point in time. Instead—as the
market value is zero if the cash flows stop—the
technical lifetime of an investment is determined.
Because of the memoryless property of the expo-
nential distribution, this approach is less suited to
modeling the failure risk of stand-alone technical
investments, which normally would increase dur-
ing the lifetime. However, it is especially suited
to modeling the bankruptcy probabilities of enter-
prises, which may be assumed as constant over
time.
Concerning the valuation of expected present val-
ues of depreciation deductions, this method has so
far only been used in the context of effective tax
rates (Diller 2008).
The consequences are twofold. First, if the cash
flows stop, the current market value of the project
becomes zero and within the scope of an asset im-
pairment the residual book value has to be written
off, so the depreciation period is shortened. Sec-
ond, in the case of an imperfect loss offset, a short-
lived project does not generate enough cash flows
to be offset against the depreciation allowances.
In this case a part of the step-up value does not
become tax-effective.
3.1 Perfect loss offset
As in section 2, I first examine the case of a per-
fect loss offset. In the following I again assume
straight-line depreciation. If the project dies, the
residual book value (A · (1 − TUL)) has to be writ-
ten off immediately, which is tax-effective under
the regime of a perfect loss offset. Before the ex-
pected present value of the depreciation-induced
tax savings can be calculated, the present value
(PV (T)) of the latter, depending on the lifetime of
the investment T , has to be determined.
(29) PV(T)= A ·s
  Min(UL,T)
0
1
ULe
−istdt
+ A ·s · Max
 
1 − TUL,0

e−isT
= A s
 
e−T ·isMax
 
0,1 − TUL

+1−e
−Min(UL,T)is
UL·is
Assuming a risk-neutral investor, we can now cal-
culate the expected present value of the tax savings
by inserting (29) into thedensity function. Themax
function is eliminated by splitting up the integral:
(30) E(PV)=A·s
 UL
0
λ · e−T ·λ ·

e−Tis ·
 
1 − TUL

+ 1−e
−T ·is
UL·is

dT +
A·s
 ∞
UL λ · e
−T ·λ ·

1−e−UL·is
UL·is

dT =
A·sULλ
2+(1−e−UL(λ+is)+ULλ)is
UL(λ+is)2
Comparative statics show that the expectedpresent
value function increases linearly in A, is concave
with respect to λ (which will be shown in figure 7)
and decreases with an increasing after-tax interest
rate.
3.2 Imperfect loss offset
As mentioned above, if the cash flows stop, all the
remaining book values have to be written off im-
mediately. In the case of an imperfect loss offset
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this depreciation is not tax-effective as far as it
would lead to a loss carry-forward, which cannot
be used as there are no future cash flows to be off-
set against. Neither can these loss carry-forwards
be transferred and used by another investor, es-
pecially in the case of a limited liability corpora-
tion, as their loss carry-forward expires in most
tax regimes if it is sold or merged. However, in
the case of a bankruptcy even a personally liable
entrepreneur may not be able to use major loss
carry-forwards for lack of future income. Neither
can these loss carry-forwards be transferred to the
next generation. Therefore, I assume that if cash
flows stop, an existing loss carry-forward is valued
at zero.
For these reasons the impairment depreciation is
only tax-effective if there are enough cash flows
to be offset against. Therefore, it is necessary to
verify if the investment is (partly) irreversible or
not. If the cash flows stop, the value of the project
is zero but it may still be possible to sell the plant
or machinery. The cost of a (fully) irreversible
investment cannot be recovered once it is installed;
therefore, there is no resale value against which to
offset the depreciation of the residual book value.
However, if the investment is only partly
irreversible there is a resale value, which may
be additionally lowered by bankruptcy costs. To
simplify I assume this resale value (net bankruptcy
costs) K to be constant over time; in this case,
the depreciation of the residual book value B(T)
can be offset against these resale earnings. In
the simplified approach according to section
2.2.1—which will be assumed in the following—it
is not the depreciation allowances that become
tax effective but the cash receipts, assuming there
is a loss carry-forward in every point in time.
Therefore, B(T) not only expresses the residual
book value but the part of the step-up value which
has not yet become tax effective, i.e. the residual
book value and the existing loss carry-forward
with B(T) = A −
  T
0
CFetωdt until the step-up
value has become completely tax effective. To
simplify, I will refer to B(T) as residual book value
in the following. As long as K < B, there are not
enough resale earnings in the last period to be
offset against the existing residual book value;
therefore only K becomes tax effective. If B < K ,
no more than the residual book value can be-
come tax effective. Figure 6 illustrates the calculus.
Again, first the present value (PV ) of the
tax savings depending on the lifetime of the
investment has to be determined concentrating
on the cash receipts. Formula (31) has to
consider that if the investment project lives
from T = 0 until T = Log[
A·ω
CF +1]
ω (s. formula
(6)) the step-up value is not yet amor-
tized, i.e., the longer the life of the project, the
higher the present value of the tax-effective efforts.
(31) PV(T)=
s
  T
0
CFet(ω−is)dt + Min(K ,B(T)) · e−T ·is
= sCF(e
T(ω−is)−1)
ω−is
+ Min(K ,B(T)) · e−T ·is
If the investment project lives longer
(T > Log[
A·ω
CF +1]
ω ), its present value of (limited)
depreciation allowances stays the same, namely
  Log[ A·ωCF +1]
ω
0
CF · et·(ω−is)dt and B(T) = 0.
Using the density function we can calculate the
expected present value of tax savings:
(32) E(PV)=s
  ∞
0
PV (T) · λ · e−T ·λdT
with the particular solution in the case of an ir-
reversible investment assuming K = 0 (for the
derivation of the general solution see Appendix
A3):
(33) E(PV)K=0 = s
CF
 
1−(1+AωCF )
1− λ+isω

λ+is−ω
The only difference compared to formula (7) is the
use of is+λ instead of is as discount factor. For that
reason, all findings concerning the optimal step-up
Figure 6: Tax effective depreciation in T
K
A
T
BT
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value or the maximum step-up value from section
2 are also valid here.
IfK ≥ A, i.e. nomatter at what (early) point in time
the cash flows stop, the step-up value A always
becomes fully tax effective and the expected tax
savings can be determined as weighted average of
the step-up value and formula (33).
(34) E(PV)K≥A =
s λλ+is A +
 
1 − λλ+is

E(PV )K=0
For 0 < K < A the general solution of (32) is given
in the appendix A3.
Figure 7 depicts the course of these functions de-
pending on λ for CF := .03, s := .4, sr := .2, is :=
.06,ω := .03,A := 1.
The functions show opposite courses. Function
(30) increases in λ. A rising λ means that more
investment projects die before their useful lives
have ended. Thus, the average depreciation period
shortens while the step-up value is fully tax effec-
tive; therefore the expected present value of depre-
ciation allowances rises. Of course, this does not
mean that the investment project becomes more
advantageous, but only theNPVof the step-up. The
situation is different if depreciation allowances are
limited by the cash flows. Here, the course of the
functions depends on the parameter K . If the in-
vestment is fully reversible (K ≥ A), the same effect
can be observed, the NPV function rises and for
λ   ∞ both functions converge. In the case of a
partly reversible investment the function shows a
considerably lower slope and limit value. Finally,
if the investment is irreversible (K = 0), the func-
tion has a negative slope as there is no positive
Figure 7: NPV depending on λ for CF := .03,
s := .4, sr := .2, is := .06, ω := .03, A := 1,
UL := 10
Perfect loss offset
Certainty
K  0.5
K  0
K  A
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Λ
0.05
0.05
0.10
NPV
effect due to a higher λ, since the depreciation of
the residual book value cannot become tax effec-
tive because there are no cash receipts to be offset
against.
The effects on the step-up investment (NPV ) can
be seen in Figure 8 (CF := .03, s := .4, sr := .2, is :=
.06,ω := .03, λ := 0.02).
Corresponding to the functions in figure 7 the
maximum step-up value increases (K = A, K =
0.5) ordecreases (K = 0) compared to the certainty
case.
4 Optimal timing
Finally I analyze whether a positive NPV should be
realized in the current period or in later periods. I
consider two scenarios.
4.1 Step-up value increases with rate ω
If the step-up value—especially in the case of good-
will—is determined by discounting the future cash
flows of the firm, it can be assumed that it increases
at the same rate ω as the cash flows (A(t) = Aet·ω).
The expected NPV of the step-up investment de-
pending on time t can, therefore, be expressed as
follows using the discount factor from formula (33)
(λ + is):
(35) E(NPV(t))=e−t·(is+λ−ω) ·

CF·s·
 
−1+(1+AωCF )
1− λ+isω

ω−is−λ
− A · sr


There are two opposing effects. On the one hand,
a positive NPV that is realized in later periods
Figure 8: NPV depending on A for CF :=
.03, s := .4, sr := .2, is := .06,ω := .03, λ := 0.02,
UL := 10
Perfect loss offset
K  A
K  0.5
K  0
Certainty
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
A0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
NPV
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decreases in value as it has to be discounted, like
cash flows that accrue in the future. On the other
hand, the step-up value is higher. The derivative
of (35) with respect to t depends on the sign of the
expression−t(is+λ−ω) and shows thepredominant
effect. There is no optimal point in time at which
the NPV should be realized. These results are also
valid for the perfect loss offset.
4.2 Step-up value remains constant
On the other hand, it is possible that the hidden
reserves remain constant over time. This could be
the case if, for example, buildings are revalued by
means that do not reflect the firm’s specific cash
flows. In the case of a perfect loss offset there is no
value of waiting since postponing the investment
has no positive effect. If we assume an imperfect
loss offset, even though the step-up value does not
increase, it is amortized faster because of rising
cash receipts. Now there is a point in time at which
one effect outweighs the other. The calculus can be
formulated as follows:
(36) E(NPV(t))=e−t·(is+λ) · 
CFet·ωs
 
−1+(1+ AωCF·et·ω )
1− is+λω

ω−is−λ
− A · sr


A general analytical optimization is neither pos-
sible nor necessary. The advantage of postponing
the step-up investment consists exclusively of the
fact that the stepped-up book values are amortized
faster when starting with a higher CF in t=0. There
is no advantage if cash flows do not rise over time
(ω ≤ 0); even if they do, the effect is quite small.
It is hence reasonable to analyze the case of max-
imum growth rates. When assuming an infinite
cash flow series the growth rate must be less than
or equal to is + λ to achieve reasonable valuation
results; formula (36) is not defined for ω  is + λ.
Using l’Hôpital’s rule, formula (36) simplifies to:
(37)  ω is+λ E(NPV (t)) =
CF·s·Log
 
1+A·e
−t(λ+is)(λ+is)
CF

λ+is
− A · e−t(λ+is) · sr
Differentiating (37) with respect to t and equating
zero yields:
(38)A· (λ + is)

e−t*(λ+is)sr − set*(λ+is)+ ACF (λ+is)

=0
By solving (38) for t* the optimal point of time for
a step-up is derived:
(39) t* =
Log

A(λ+is)sr
CF(s−sr)

λ+is
Figure (9) illustrates the course of the optimal step-
up time depending onA for CF := .08, s := .5, sr :=
.2, is := .06, λ := .07; the maximum step-up value
for these parameters is AMax := 2.5.
t* increases with a rising step-up value A; this is
because the higher the step-up value A in relation
to the starting cash flow CF , the greater the ef-
fect of waiting. A relatively low starting cash flow
CF means that the tax-effective cash flow period
will stretch over a long period of time. In this
case, shifting future tax-effective efforts to earlier
periods (by means of waiting) increases the net
present value more than if the depreciation pe-
riod is already quite short because of high current
cash flows. Negative values of t* indicate that the
optimum point in time lies in the past.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
The assumption of a perfect loss offset may be rea-
sonable when analyzing small investment projects.
Depreciation allowances that exceed the cash flows
of the current period can be offset against profits
of other investment projects, which lower the tax
payments of the firm. In the case an entire firm is
revalued this argument is not valid and decisions
Figure 9: Optimal timing for CF := .08,
s := .5, sr := .2, is := .06, λ := .07
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
A
2
0
2
4
6
8
t
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cannot be made just by looking at the depreci-
ation allowances. When assuming an imperfect
loss-offset the step-up decision changes in many
ways. First, even in the case of an advantageous
depreciationmethod theNPVof the step-up invest-
ment features both a maximum and a zero point,
i.e., there is a step-up value that is optimal and
should be realized if possible, and a step-up value
above which the step-up investment becomes dis-
advantageous. Second, the acquisition premium
in the case of an asset deal may be considerably
smaller.
I have been able to show that a simplified approach
that focuses only on the cash flows is in most cases
able to determine the maximum step-up value.
The detailed approach is quite complex, even in
the simple deterministic case.
Using this simplified approach I have been able to
implement an uncertain lifetime of the investment
which can cause themaximumstep-up value to rise
or to fall depending on the degree of irreversibility
of the underlying investment.
Furthermore, I have been able to show that it
can be reasonable under certain conditions not
to realize positive NPVs of step-up investments
immediately, but in future periods. Generally this
is only reasonable for relatively high growth rates.
An optimal trigger point has been determined for
step-up values that remain constant over time.
Future research should lay special emphasis on
extending the model. In the present paper uncer-
tainty is only expressed in the lifetime of the invest-
ment project, but not in the cash flows themselves.
The implementation of stochastic cash flows may
provide additional insights.
Appendix
A1: Lambert W-Function
The Lambert W function (W) is defined as the
inverse function of f (w) = w · ew and thus verifies
z = W (z) · eW (z). To solve economic equations only
the real-valued part of the Lambert W function is
relevant; in this case W is only defined for w > −1e .
The function W (z) is multivalued for −1e ≤ z < 0,
i.e. there are two possible real values of W (z). The
solution of the second branch satisfyingW (z) ≤ −1
is normally referred to as W−1(z), (s. Chapeau-
Blondeau and Monir 2002).
Figure 10 depicts the course of the Lambert W
function.
There are numerous applications of the LambertW
function, e.g., combinatorial problems or iterated
exponentiation, but with regard to the present
paper the function is used to solve equations,
which would have no closed form solution oth-
erwise (Corless, Gonnet, Hare, Jeffrey, and Knuth
1996). In the following I show how equation (14)
is derived from equation (11); all other expres-
sions using the LambertW function can be derived
analogously.
(40)
CF·
 
1−e−
A·is
CF

s
is
− A · sr = 0 
CF
is
 
1 − 1
e
A·is
CF

= A · srs  
−CFis = A · e
A·is
CF · srs − e
A·is
CF · CFis  
−CFis = e
A·is
CF ·

A · srs −
CF
is

 
−CFis · e
− ssr = e
A·is
CF −
s
sr ·

A · srs −
CF
is

 
− ssr · e
− ssr = e
A·is
CF −
s
sr ·

A · isCF −
s
sr

 
W

− ssr · e
− ssr

= A · isCF −
s
sr
 
A =
CF ·

W

− ssr ·e
− ssr

+ ssr

is
A2: Derivation of equation (16)
Setting equation (12) equal to zero yields:
Figure 10: The Lambert W-Function
1

1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
z
6
4
2
2
Wz
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(41) -AMax · s
 
AMax·is
2CF − 1

− AMax · sr = 0
  AMax = 2(CFs−CFsr)s·is
As the decreasing cash flow series approaches zero
in the long run, unlikewith a risingor constant cash
flow series there are only limited tax-effective cash
flows to be offset against depreciation allowances,
namely
  ∞
0
CF · e−is·tdt = CFis for ω = −is. The rela-
tionship between reduced tax rate and regular tax
rate determines whether the maximum step-up
value lies below or above this threshold:
(42) 2(CFs−CFsr)s·is ≤
CF
is
  sr ≥ s2
From this point onwards (sr < s2 ), despite a ris-
ing step-up value, the sum of tax-effective cash
flows remains constant (CFis ). The maximum step-
up value in this case can be determined by setting
A := CFis in the first part of (12) and solving for
AMax:
(43) −CFis s

CF
is
is
2CF − 1

− AMax · sr = 0 
AMax = CF·s
2is·sr
A3: General solution to equation (32)
Part of A which has not yet been tax-effective
depending on T:
(44) B(T)= A-
 T
0
CFetωdt = A − CF(e
Tω−1)
ω
Point in time at which B(T) falls below K:
(45) B(T*) = A −
CF
 
eT
*ω−1

ω = K 
T* =
Log

(A−K+ CFω )ω
CF

ω
The second threshold (B(T) = 0) is given by for-
mula (6). Therefore, the expected present value of
the tax savings reads:
(46) E(PV)=
s
 T*
0

PV (T) + K · e−T ·is

· λ · e−T ·λdT +
s
 x
T*

PV (T) + B(T) · e−t·is

· λ · e−T ·λdT +
s
 ∞
x PV (x) · λ · e
−T ·λdT
After a few conversion steps one yields:
(47) E(PV)=
s λλ+is

	

CF

1−(1+ (A−K)ωCF )
1− λ+isω

λ−ω+is
+ K


+s
 
1 − λλ+is
 CF1−(1+AωCF )1− λ+isω

λ−ω+is
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